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ABSTRACT 
The securitization  of fixed-rate mortgages suggests that the FRA/VA market 
was fully integrated  with capital markets by the early l98Os and that the 
conventional market  moved toward integration  during the l98Os.  Assuming 
full integration of FHA/VA5 via the GNMA securitization  process, we first 
estimate equations explaining near—par GNMA prices weekly for the 1981-88 
period.  The price is then set equal  to the new—issue price and, based 
upon the preferred equation, the perfect—market  retail coupon rate is 
computed.  Next we estimate equations (for three  year segments of the 
1971-88 period) explaining conventional commitment  mortgage coupon rates 
in terms of current and lagged  values of this perfect-market coupon rate. 
Finally, we examine differences  between the perfect—market and actual 
coupon rates and compute the impact of these differences  on residential 
capital accumulation. 
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Integration  of Mortgage  and Capital Markets  and 
-  the  Accumulation  of Residential  Capital 
Patric  H. Hendershott  and Robert  Van Order 
The fixed-rate  home  mortgage  market  appears to be fully  integrated  into 
"the capital  market"  broadly defined.  That is, mortgage  rates move in response 
to  changes  in other  capital market  rates,  and mortgage  funds  are readily 
available  at  going  market  rates.  Mortgage  rates can diverge  from  other  rates 
becauae  the "technical"  characteristics  —— call  provisions  in particular  -— of 
mortgages  and other securities  differ  and the "price" of these characteristics 
can change, but in a fully  integrated  capital market  shifts in the demands  for 
or supplies  of mortgage  funds will not cause divergence  to  occur. 
The mortgage  market  was integrated  gradually  throughout  the l970s  and 
first half  of the l980s  with  the development  of active  markets  for mortgage 
pass-through  securities.  Legislation  in 1968  and 1970 established  the 
Government  Hational  Mortgage  Association  (Ginnie Mae)  and the Federal Home  Loan 
Mortgage  Corporation  (Freddie Mac)  ,  and by  1971 the Ginnie  Mae pass-through 
program  for government-insured  FHA/VA  mortgages  and the Freddie Mac program  for 
conventional  mortgages  were in operation.  Integration  was stimulated  in  the 
l980s by the deregulation  of deposit  rate ceilings  and the erosion  of  thrift 
tax subsidies,  developments  that eliminated  thrift cost  advantages  in funding 
mortgages. 
Mortgage  market  integration  has had conflicting  effects  on  homebuyers. 
During most of  the l960s and 1970s,  existence  of specialized  housing  finance 
institutions  caused  mortgage  funds to be cheaper than  they  would  have  been  with 
full integration.  In contrast,  during  the credit  crunches  of 1969—70 and 
1974-75 and during  much  of the early and middle  l980s, when the traditional 
housing  finance  institutions  were  under  enormous pressures  and the conventional —2— 
secondary  market  had not yet exercised  its full force, mortgage  funds were 
either  unavailable  or relatively  expensive,  and homebuyers  would  have 
benefitted  from a more integrated  system. 
This paper  explains  how the market  for fixed-rate  mortgages  has developed 
since  1971  and how this development  has affected  the accummulation  of 
residential  capital.  We begin  with a discussion  of  the most important  change 
in the market:  the growth  in mortgage  pass—through  securities.  We then  test 
how this  change  has altered  the relationship  between  mortgage  and Treasury 
rates.  We do this by estimating  (1) what the mortgage  rate  would  have  been had 
markets  been "perfect"  and  (2) how actual  rates  responded  to changes  in the 
perfect—market  rate for different  subperiods  of the 1971—88 time span.  The 
perfect—market  rate  adjusts  Treasury  rates  for the value of the prepayment 
option  in  mortgages.  The impact  of an  imperfect  mortgage  market  on  residential 
capital accumulation  is then  measured  as the difference  between  the 
accumulation  based  upon the actual  mortgage  rate (and credit  rationing  in the 
1970s)  and that based on the perfect rate (and no rationing) 
.  The  vehicle  for 
these  calculations  is a modified  version of the Housing  Sector  of the 
Washington  University  Macro  Model. 
I.  The Development  of Mortgage  Pass-Through  Securities 
In  1968,  the Government  Hational  Mortgage  Association  )Ginnie Mae) was 
formed  within  the U.S. Department  of  Housing  and Urban  Development  to 
administer  government  mortgage  support programs.  Two years  later Ginnie  Mae 
began  guaranteeing  mortgage—backed  pass-through  securities,  GMMAs,  representing 
shares  in pools of FHA/VA  loans.  Investors  in  pass—throughs  receive  a pro rata 
share of  the payments,  both scheduled  and early  (in  the event of prepayment  or 
default),  on the underlying  mortgages.  While  investors  in whole  FHA/VA  loans 
are insured by FHA or VA  against  loss  of  principal  and interest,  investors  in 
GNMA5  are guaranteed  the full timely  payment of  principal  and interest. —3— 
In  1970, the Federal  Home  Loan  Mortgage  Corporation  (Freddie Mac) waa 
chartered  to spur  the development  of a secondary  market  for conventional 
mortgages.  As part of this effort, Freddie Mac introduced  the first 
conventional  mortgage  pass-through  in  1971,  the Mortgage  Participation 
Certificate  (PC)  .  While  Freddie  Mac doesn't have a full faith  and credit 
Federal  guarantee,  the underlying  conventional mortgage  is not itself  fully 
insured.  Thus  the Freddie  Mac guarantee  adds more  value  to the underlying 
mortgage  than  does the Ginnie  Mae guarantee.  In 1981, the Federal  National 
Mortgage Association  (Fannie Mae)  initiated a conventional  mortgage-backed 
security  (MBS(  program similar  to  Freddie Mac's  PC  program.  Fannie  has 
intermediated  in  the more  traditional  sense, buying  mortgages  and issuing  its 
own debt,  since  1938, and it has an  implied guarantee  comparable  to Freddie 
Mac's. 
Statutes  limit  the dollar  value  of  loans  that can be pooled  into the 
various pass-through  securities.  The limit on  GNMAs  follows  from  the limit on 
the underlying  FHA and VA loans.  The 1988 limit, which  varies  regionally,  is 
$67,500 to $101,250.  These  limits have  changed little  in the 1980s.  The 
dollar  limit on conventional  loans  that Fannie  Mae and Freddie Mac can 
purchase,  the  conforming  limit, changes  annually with a house price  index, 
but does not vary regionally.  The 1988 limit was $168,700 up 45 percent  since 
1985.  In 1987, over 90 percent  of fixed—rate  home  mortgage  loans  (85 percent 
of dollar  volume) was eligible  for pooling by the agencies. 
The markets  for fixed  rate FMA/VA  and conforming  conventional  loan  pass- 
throughs developed  at  different  rates.  The top half  of Table  1 presents  data 
on  the growth in  the securitization  of fixed-rate  FHA/VA  loans.  The importance 
of  pass-througha  to the new  origination  market  is measured  as the ratio of GNMA 
issues backed  by 1—4 family  loans  to total originations  of these  loans  (Ginnie —4— 
Mae is prohibited  from securitizing  FMA/VAs  over  18 months  old)  .  By  the second 
half of  the 1970s, two-thirds  of FRA/VA  originations  went into  GNMA  pools; by 
the early  1980s four—fifths  did; since  1982 all FHA/VA5  have gone into  GNMAs. 
The pass-through  market  for conforming  conventional  loans developed  less 
rapidly  )see the lower half of  Table  1).  The best measure of the two agencies' 
presence  in  this market  is the share of new fixed-rate  conventional  FRMs 
)generally defined  as less than one year since origination)  eligible  for agency 
securitization  )under the conforming  limit) that is, in fact,  securitized  by 
Freddie Mac and Fannie  Mae.  Column  1 indicates  pass—through  issues  backed  by 
new FRMs; the product  of  columns  2 and  3  is the total volume  of FRM 
originations,  conforming  and nonconforming.  Because  roughly  80 percent of the 
dollar  volume  of  F814 originations  is under  the conforming  limit,  the ratio of 
pass-throughs  backed  by new FRMs to  0.8 times FaN originations  is an  estimate 
of this best  measure.  In  the early 1980s,  less than  5 percent  of newly— 
originated  conforming  conventional  fixed—rate  home  mortgages  was  securitized, 
in  contrast  to 77 percent  of  FHA/VA5.  By 1986-87, though,  over  half of these 
mortgages  went  into  agency  pass throughsJ 
The difference  in  the development  of FHA/VA  and conventional  pass- 
throughs in the 1970s  and early  l980s stems largely  from the historical 
differences  in  the origination  of FHA/VA  and conventional  mortgages.  Mortgage 
bankers have  tended  to dominate  the FRA/VA  market,  accounting  for 70 to 80 
percent of originations  )see top of  table)  versus only 7 to 15 percent  of 
conventional  originations  )see bottom  of table), and they  sell  virtually  all 
their originations  to other  investors.  Thus when  an improved method  for 
selling mortgages  became  available,  mortgage  bankers  quickly  took  advantage  of 
the opportunity.  By  the early  1980s, virtually  all mortgage  banker 
originations  were sold  to Ginnie Mae,  Fannie Mae,  and Freddie Mac (some 
conventionals  were sold to Fannie  Mae for its portfolio) .  In contrast, —5— 
depository  institutions  have  dominated  conventional  originations  (80 to 90 
percent);  and, at least until the 1980s,  they tended  to keep their  originations 
as  portfolio  investments.  Thus an improved  selling method  alone  was not 
sufficient  to  stimulate  the conventional  pass-through  market,  the explanation 
for the increased  securitization  of conventional  FRMs is best left for later  in 
the paper. 
II.  Models of Mortgage Rates  and Markets 
The last twenty  years  of  mortgage—market  analysis  have been  dominated  by 
two rather  extreme approaches.  The first emphasized  segmented  markets 
dominated  by thrifts and ad hoc empirical  approaches  with proxies  for effects 
of rationing  and regulations.  The more recent approach  has emphasized 
neoclassical  competitive  markets,  implicitly  at  least  on the grounds  that  the 
rise  of the secondary  markets  has made mortgages  just  another  bond traded in a 
very liquid market. 
Both approaches  appear  to have been right, but at different  times.  The 
first  approach was a reasonable  one in  the 1970s  but has been supplanted  by  the 
neoclassical  version  in the middle  1980g.  In this section we emphasize  the 
neoclassical,  competitive  model  because  it will  be the basis of our empirical 
work in section III.  We then  discuss  the segmented  market  version  and how it 
departs  from  the competitive  model. 
The Neoclassical  Perfect Market  Model:  Theory 
The neoclassical  model  applies  recent work in  financial  markets  under 
perfect  competition  (see, e.g.,  Black  and Scholes  (1973), Brennan  and Schwartz 
(1977), and Cox,  Ingersoll  and Ross (1985)] to  mortgages.  The models  derive 
prices  for risky  securities  in a world  free of both transaction  costs and 
arbitrage  profits. -6— 
The underlying  methodology  as  applied to mortgage  and other markets  (see 
Brennan  and Schwartz (1985) and Hendershott  and Van Order  (1988) for 
expositions applied  to mortgage  markets]  comes  from Black and Scholes'  insight 
that in perfect  capital  markets  with  enough  independent  assets  a portfolio  of 
several assets can be set up  that,  at least  over  a short  time  period,  exactly 
replicates  the returns  of the asset  to be  priced.  From  this portfolio,  the 
price  of the aseet  in question  can, with some  mathematical  dexterity,  be 
determined. 
In mortgage  markets  the bulk of research has been on  pricinq  long-term 
fixed—rate  mortgages  [see Dunn  and Mcconnell  (1981)  ,  Buser  and Mendershott 
(1984)  ,  Brennan  and Schwartz  (1985)  and lCau et. al.  [1986)  ].  Most  of  the 
analyses  have  abstracted  from  default  risk  and focussed  on the borrower's 
option to prepay  at  par.  In our empirical  explanations  in  Section  III of 
Ginnie Mae prices  or retail  commitment  coupon  rates on 80% loan—to—value  loans, 
this  focus  is appropriate  because  there  is little  default  risk in 80% loan—to— 
value  loans  (maybe 3 to  8 basis points  in coupon premium)  or Ginnie  Maes.2 
An investor  in a typical  fixed—rate  mortgage  is long  an amortizing  30— 
year  bond but short  en American  call on  the bond.  Absent  default  risk  and 
transaction  costs,  the risk  in  holding the mortgage  comes  only from  interest 
rates and is composed  of two parts:  the usual interest  rate  riak  on the bond 
and the interest  rate risk  on  the option.  The combination  of the two leads to 
an asymmetry  that  is the central  issue in mortgage  pricing:  when interest 
rates rise, the mortgage  investor loses because  mortgage  price  falls,  but when 
rates fall,  the investor's  gains  are limited because  borrowers  will exercise 
their option  to prepay  at  par. 
- 
This option  is most  transparent  in the case  of the FHA/VA  mortgages  in 
Ginnie  Mae poo1s because  those  mortgages  can be assumed  by new house buyers. 
Thus  the financing  and selling  of the house  are, in perfect  markets,  separate. —7— 
But there are transaction  costs,  -and while people  do seem  to act qualitatively 
as  the model  says, they  do not prepay  as ruthlessly  as some early  applications 
of the models  suggested.  This is apparent  from  both  prepayment  data,  which 
show  only gradual changes  in prepayment  rates in the face  of large  interest 
rate declines,  and empirical  analysis  of  prepayments  [e.g., Foster  and Van 
Order (1985)  and Green and Shoven  (1986)].  Nonetheless,  the frictionless  model 
is a good beginning,  and it certainly  captures the qualitative  properties  of 
more complicated  models. 
Tha basic  idea  of the model is depicted  in  Figure  1.  Line  AM depicts  the 
value  of a noncallable  amortizing  bond  as a function  of "the" interest  rate.3 
The bond  has the usual  downward  sloping convex  shape.  Line 8CM shows  the value 
of a mortgage  that is callable  at  par,  and the difference  between  the two 
curves  is the value of the call option.  The mortgage  can never  have a value 
greater  than par,  and in fact  the curve must become  tangent  to the par line. 
This tangency  is a first  order  condition  for optimal  exercise  of the call (see 
Hendershott—Van  Order (1988) for a brief  discussion)  .  Note that the 
relationship  between value  and interest  rate  is complicated.  For deeply 
discounted  mortgages,  the relationship  is just like  that for the bond (the 
option  is too far out of  the money  to be  valuable),  but as value approaches  par 
the curve  becomes concave  rather than  convex (traders refer  to this  as negative 
convexity) 
Because of  various  transaction  costs,  mortgages  are not generally  called 
in the frictionless  manner  described  here.  Transaction  costs  mean that the 
mortgage  value curve  can be above  par as rates fall  (the OM line) but there 
will be a tendency  for the value to revert  to par as rates become  so low that 
exercise  is quite  probable.  Hence, the value—interest  rate  curve  f  or mortgages 
can, in principle,  have an upward  sloping segment  (traders sometimes  call this 
negative  duration). —8— 
Empirical  pricing  models  used  on Wall Street (largely unpublished( 
generally  take a probabilistic  approach  to  prepayment,  assuming  that  the odds 
of prepayment  increase  (in  a nonlinear  way( as the new-issue  mortgage  rate 
falls  below  the coupon  rates  on existing  mortgages.  These models  capture the 
flavor  of the option  approach,  but the changes  in  shape  of the mortgage-value 
curve, particularly  in  the range  just below  par (which is the range 
corresponding  to new issuas(  ,  are not nearly  as striking as we depicted  in 
Figure  1. 
Neoclassical  Perfect Market  Model:  Empirical  Implications 
The option—oriented  pricing models,  given a prepayment  function,  provide 
exact predictions  of mortgage  price  in a similar way to that in which  the 
Elack-Scholes  model  provides  an exact prediction  of a stock  option's  price.  We 
do not intend to  use the model that way.  Rather  we shall regress  mortgage 
price  on the variables  that  the model  tells  us should affect  the values  of the 
call option  and the underlying  noncallable  bond, and we shall  see if 
gualitative  properties  of the model  hold up.  What  the models  suggest  is that 
the price of a standard  fixed-rate  mortgage  should  depend only  on:  its coupon 
rate, term  to  maturity,  market  interest  rates of  various  maturities,  and the 
volatility  of the intarest  rates.  More  specifically: 
(l( an  egual  rise in all market  interest  rates,  holding  the coupon 
constant,  should  lower mortgage  price  (except in the extreme negative 
duration  case  discussed  above( 
(2( a twisting  of the yield  curve  (holding the "average"  of  rates 
constant(  that  increases  the difference  between long  and short rates 
(the slope(  should  raise  the value  of a mortgage  because  the implied 
increased  probability  that  interest  rates will rise  reduces  the value 
of the call option. 
(3(  increases  in volatility  will  lower mortgage  value because4greater 
volatility  raises  the value  of the homeowner  call option. —9— 
(4)  interactions  among  the variables  should  matter.  In particular: 
a)  When the mortgage  is at a big discount (the coupon  rate is low 
-  relative to interest  rates)  ,  the  effect of volatility  and slope 
should be  smaller  because  the option  is out of the money.  Thus 
slope  and volatility  should both be interacted  with the 
difference  between  the coupon  rate  and market  rates. 
b)  When  rates  are expected  to  rise,  the effect  of volatility 
should be  smaller  because  the option  is less likely  to be 
exercised.  Thus volatility  and slope should  be interacted. 
C)  When  rates  are  expected  to  fall and thus the expected  mortgage 
-  life  is short,  mortgage value  will  depend  more heavily  on short 
term  rates  and less heavily5on  long  term rates.  Thus slope 
squared  should be included. 
In summary,  if we write  the price of a mortgage as: 
P = M)c,r, A, a)  (1) 
where c is the coupon, r market  interest  rates,  A the slope  of the yield  curve 
(long less short)  and a interest  rate volatility,  then 
M  >0,  M  <0,  M  >0,  M  <0,  (2)  c  r  A 
M  >0,  M  <0,  M  >0,M  >0, andM  <0. 
(c—r) A  (c—r) a  Aa  00 
All of these  are reflections  of the complex interactions  of the call  option 
with  the bond  value. 
Alternatively,  if we explain new issue  coupon rates  —— set the price  at 
par  (less points  net of origination  costs)  ,  then 
c = 8(r, A,a) ,  (3) 
where8  >0,  8<0,  8>0,  8  <0,  8  <0,  and8  >.  r  A  a  Aa  00 —10— 
Segmented  Markets 
The perfect  market  model says that mortgage  price  (or alternatively  the 
mortgage  coupon  rate  for a given mortgage  price) depends  on a small  number  of 
general  capital market  variables,  that  the response  to  changes  in those 
variables  is predictable  and fast,  and that  mortgage  price (or coupon  rate) 
does not depend  on  variables  peculiar  to  the mortgage  market,  like details  of 
particular  lending  institutions. 
This would  have seemed like  a silly model twenty  years  ago, when mortgage 
lending  was tied  to particular  institutions,  the thrifts.  Portfolio 
restrictions  on savings and loans  (no corporate  loans,  bonds, or equity  issues) 
encouraged  their  investment  in residential  mortgages,  and these investments 
were  especially  profitable  to thrifts owing  to special tax advantages.  The tax 
preference  was the ability  of  thrifts  to  compute  loan  loss reserves  that far 
exceeded  a reasonable  provision  for normal  losses, as long  as thrifts  invested 
a large  fraction  of  their  assets in  housing—related  loans  or liquid  assets 
(Hendershott and Villani,  1980 appendix) 
.  In effect,  thrifts were allowed  to 
transfer  large portions  of their  before  tax income  to reserves,  thereby 
avoiding  taxes.  Between  1962 and 1969, the transfer was limited  to 60  percent 
of  taxable  income; between  1969  and 1979, the fraction  was gradually  reduced to 
40  percent;  the Tax Reform  Act of 1986 lowered  the fraction  to 8 percent. 
The incentive  provided  by the extraordinary  loan  loss  provisions  for 
investment  in residential mortgages  depends on the expected level  of thrift 
taxable  profits  (with no  profits,  the incentive  is zero)  ,  the  income  tax rate, 
and the statutory  fraction of income  that  can be transfered  to  reserves. 
Assuming  a one percent  net pretax  return on  assets,  the incentive  was 
substantial  in the 1960s  and 1970s.  In the l960s when the transfer  fraction 
was 60  percent,  savings  and loans would have accepted  a three—quarters 
percentage  point lower pretax  return  on tax preferred  housing-related  assets —11— 
than  on comparable  nonpreferred  assets.  By 1979, when  the transfer  fraction 
was down  to 40  percent,  they  would have accepted a half  percentage  point  less. 
In the 1960s and 1970s  world,  connections  with  capital  markets  were 
tenuous  and gradual.  A rise in interest  rates  could raise mortgage  rates  if it 
increased  deposit  rates,  but deposit  rates had ceilings.  Increased  rates might 
cause deposit  outflows,  i.e., disintermediation,  but that  was gradual  and to 
the extent  there was mortgage  rationing (from state usury  laws, FHA ceilings 
and/or  general  sluggishness)  the effect of rising  market  rates on mortgage 
rates  was slow and tenuous.  Hence  most  researchers  at the time  focussed  on 
things  peculiar  to  the thrift  industry,  such as deposit  rates and deposit 
flows,  rather than  general  capital  market  conditions.  If we regressed  actual 
mortgage  price  or rates during  such  a period on fictional  mortgage  prices  or 
rates predicted  by  the perfect  market  model, we  would  expect to  see a bad fit. 
Moreover,  to the extent  that the predicted  price/rate  had any effect,  it  would 
be a lagged  one. 
A separate  issue is whether  mortgage  rates  in the l970s  were  higher  or 
lower than they  would  have  been in the perfect market  case.  One might  suspect 
that they  were generally  lower  owing  to the large  tax advantages  until  recently 
enjoyed by thrifts,  the portfolio  restrictions  that kept thrifts  out of many 
other lending  activities,  and the possibility  that  thrifts did not fully 
appreciate  the value of the call option  borrowers  were  receiving.  Oeposit  rate 
ceilings probably  lowered rates  in some periods  and raised them in  others. 
III.  Analysis  of GNMA  Price Data 
Roth (1988) analyzes  the integration  of mortgage  and capital  markets  by 
looking at changes in the correlation  between  conventional  commitment  mortgage 
rates and  Treasuries.  Me  finds that the correlation has increased over  time 
and  is  currently  quite  high.  In this section we extend  that  sort  of analysis —12— 
by constructing  a perfect  mortgage-like  capital market  rate,  looking  at lags in 
the adjustment  of conventional  commitment  mortgage  rates to perfect  rates 
(rather than to Treasury  rates),  and estimating  whether  observed  mortgage  rates 
have  been  higher  or lower than  perfect  capital markets  would have warranted. 
Our analysis  consists  of two parts.  First, we assume  that the GNMA 
market  has been integrated  with capital markets  since  1981.  This is because 
GNMAs have full faith  end credit  guarantees  and have  traded  like Treasuries, 
with  comparably  low transactions  costs  and high  volume, at least  since  1981. 
We  begin by estimating  a price  equation  for ONMA5.  The neoclassical  model 
says  that  the price of a GNMA should  depend  on its coupon  and term,  market 
interest  rates,  and interest  rate  volatility,  with  properties  discussed  in 
Section  II.  We then  estimate  this equation,  set price  equal  to the new—issue 
price, and solve  the equation  for the perfect—market  retail  coupon  rate. 
Second, we regress conventional  commitment  mortgage  coupon  rates  on 
current  and past values  of the estimated  perfect-market  coupon  rate taken  from 
the ONMA  equation.  If  markets  are perfect,  there  should be no lag and the 
coefficient  of the current rate should be unity.  We test this,  and we also 
look at  the difference  between  actual  and predicted  rates  over  time to  see when 
actual  mortgage  rates were  above  or below the perfect—market  rate. 
GNMA Prices 
Our analysis  of the determinants  of mortgage  prices  is based  upon  weekly 
GNMA price  and coupon  data from  the DRI data  base for the January  1981-July 
1988 period.  These data  are supposed to be for current-coupon,  near—par 
mortgages;  in  fact,  the GNMA  prices  vary from  91 to 101.  The seven—year 
constant maturity  yield  is the basic  Treasury  rate, and slope  is defined  as the 
difference  between the seven—year  and six—month  Treasury  rates.  All interest 
rates,  including  the mortgage  coupon  rate,  are computed  on a bond- equivalent 
basis  and are measured  in percentage  points,  Volatility  is measured  as the —13— 
cumulative  absolute  change  in the seven—year  rate  over the previous  20  weeks. 
Using historic  volatility  presents  some  problems because  it will probably  lag 
behind  traders'  expected  volatility. 
The first equation  explaining  the ONMA  price  in Table 2 includes only  the 
coupon rate,  the seven-year  rate, the slope,  and volatility.  The basic  call— 
option model  is confirmed:  price  is  positively  related to the slope  (high 
slope,  lower probability  of call) and negatively  related to volatility  (greater 
volatility;  greater  probability  of  call)  .  Price is also  positively  and 
negatively  related,  respectively,  to  the coupon  and seven-year  Treasury  rates, 
with  their  coefficients  being  virtually  identical  in absolute  velue.  The 
latter is consistent  with  the proposition  that  an equal  rise in  the coupon  rate 
and all interest  rates  should  not affect  the price  of a bond  that is close  to 
par.  While  the regression  coefficients  are all statistically  significant  at 
the 0.01 level,  the residuals  are positively  correlated.6  When  a semi— 
difference  transformation  is performed,  the coefficients  change  little,  and the 
slope and volatility  coefficients  are still  2 and 3 times  their  respective 
standard  errors. 
The third  and fourth  equations  include the interaction  of slope and 
volatility  with  the spread  between the coupon  and seven—year  rates.  A large 
spread says  the option  is in the money  and thus  mortgage  price  will  be quite 
sensitive  to slope  and volatility.  In  contrast,  price  should  be relatively 
insensitive when the spread  is zero or  negative.  As expected,  the slope  and 
volatility  coefficients  in the previous  equations  are now apportioned  between 
the straight variable  and its interaction with  the coupon—seven  year spread, 
with  the latter having  greater  statistical  significance.  As the spread 
declines  (the mortgage  goes  to a discount),  the impact  of slope  and volatility 
(the call  value)  decreases. —14— 
The fifth and aixth  equations  in Table  3  include  the slope  and volatility 
square  terms,  as well  as their product.  Because  interpretation  of these 
equations  is difficult,  Table  3 has been constructed,  partial derivatives  of 
price  with  respect  to volatility  and slope are computed  from  equation  2-6 in 
Table 2  for slope varying  from —1.5 percentage  points  to +2.5 percentage  points 
and volatility  ranging  from  one to five (three to five when  the yield  curve  is 
downward  sloping)  ,  reflecting the values generally  experienced  over the 1971-88 
period.  For a positively  sloped yield  curve,  the partials  are as expected: 
positive  and negative  with respect to slope and volatility,  respectively,  and 
smaller in absolute  magnitude  the more the mortgage  is at a discount (the  call 
is less in  the money)  .  For  negatively  sloped yield  curves,  though,  the partial 
with  respect to slope  is effectively  zero, and the partial  with respect to 
volstility  is reduced  in absolute  magnitude. 
We ran similar regressions  for the 1980—SB and 1982—Be  periods,  and we 
ran regressions using the 10 year and  3  month Treasury  rstes.  While in  some 
cases  the signs of the cross  partials were  not as expected,  the results were 
broadly  similar to those  in Table 2.  We chose the 1981—SB  regression  because 
it looked  the most  like what the neoclassical  model  says  and,  hence,  is the 
best  perfect market  benchmark.  None of the results  that  follow  are changed 
much if the other  regressions  are used. 
Conventional  Commitment  Mortgage  Rates 
To determine  how the conventional  mortgage  market  has been  integrated 
with  capital markets  generally,  we regress retail  conventional  commitment  rates 
on the current  and lagged  one to eight week  values  of the perfect—market  rate 
implied  by  the GNMA price  equation.  To  obtain this  perfect-market  rate, we 
solve  the estimated  price  equation  )2—6  in  Table  2)  for the coupon  rate,  set 
the mortgage  price  equal to 100 less the actual points  charged  in the 
conventional  market )less one point presumed  to  equal  origination  costs) —15— 
recompute  the coupon  rate using  the observed  values  of the other  variables, 
convert  the rate to a mortgage (rather than  bond-equivalent)  basis, and add 50 
basis  points  for servicing  and other  costs.  The retail  commitment  rate and 
points  are those obtained  by the Federal Home  Loan  Hortgage  Corporation  in a 
weekly  survey  of 125 major  lenders  conducted  since the spring of 1971.  To  the 
extent that integration has occurred,  we should expect  changes  in the perfect— 
market  coupon  rate to be reflected  quickly  and fully in the conventional 
commitment  rate. 
Table  4 contains the estimated  coefficients  and standard errors,  with the 
semidifference  transformation,  for weekly  data from  the 1986—88,  1983-85, 
1980—82,  1976—79,  and 1971-75 time  periods.  These estimates  are summarized  in 
Table  5,  which  reports the cummulative  adjustment  concurrently  and over  two, 
four,  six, and eight week lags.  The shift toward  integrated  markets  is 
striking.  The percentage  of the change  in  the GNMA  rate  that is reflected 
instantaneously  in the retail  conventional  rate  rises monotonically  from 
effectively  zero in  the 1970s  to 8  in the 1980—82 period,  16 in the 1983—85 
period,  and 59 in the 1986—88  period.  The fraction  of  the change  in the GNMA 
rate reflected  in the conventional  rate within  two weeks  rises monotonically 
from  a sixth  in first half  of the l970s,  to almost  half in  the early  1980s, to 
over half  in the 1983-85 period,  and to nearly  one in recent  years. 
This shift  is confirmed  by direct  regressions  )specific results  not 
reported  here)  of the conventional  commitment  rate on proxies  for the call 
premium  and current and lagged  values  of  the seven—year  Treasury  rate.7  The 
percentage  change in the Treasury  rate that is reflected  instantaneously  in the 
conventional  rate  rises  from  3  and 5 in  the earlier periods  to 20 for the 
1984-86 period  and 52 for 1986—88.  similarly,  the percentage  reflected  within 
two weeks  rises  from  30 to 40 to 50 to  75. -16— 
Differences  in Actual  and Perfect—Market  Commitment  Rates 
The first  three  columns of Table 6 list the annual  average  values  of the 
actual  conventional  mortgage  commitment  rate, our fictional  perfect-market 
rate,  and the difference  between  them for the 1971—88  period.8  The next column 
contains  the average yearly  difference  between the actual GNMA  coupon  and the 
estimated  coupon  obtained  by solving equation  (2-6)  in  Table  2.  As can be 
seen,  these  estimation  errors  are less than 1D  basis points  in  all but two 
years, 1982 and 1984, and less than 3D basis  points  in  those.  These  errors 
reflect  our inability  to  fully  specify all the nonlinearities  and interactions 
in the pricing  of GNMA5, as well as to measure  the variables  (especially 
volatility)  precisely.  Thus the difference  between  the conventional  error  and 
the GMMA  error  (zero prior  to l98D because we have no  better  estimate) ,  is  our 
best  estimate  of the difference  between actual  and perfect—market  retail 
conventional  commitment  rates,  and the perfect-market  rate plus the GNMA error, 
shown  in the last column, is our best  estimate  of the perfect—market  rate. 
The precise  differences  are,  of course, subject  to some error;  the actual 
rats is a survey rate  and the perfect rate is computed  from  an empirical 
equation  estimated  with some error.  Nonetheless,  the overall pattern  of the 
differences  seems  both systematic  and plausible  enough  to be taken seriously. 
The sctusl  rate was three—quarters  of a percentage  point  below  the perfect— 
market  rate in the 1971-75 period;  a third of a point  below  in the 1976—SD 
period;  and roughly  half s point  above the perfect rate in the 1982-86 period. 
Beginning  in the middle  of 1987, the  actual  rate  is very  close  to the perfect 
rate, the conventional  conforming  fixed—rate  mortgage  market  seemingly  being 
fully integrsted  into  capital  markets. —17— 
As explained  above,  the low  mortgage  rates  in the l970s  can be attributed 
to tax advantages  for thrift  mortgage  investments  and portfolio  restrictions 
against nonmortgage  investments.  The switch in  the 1980s  reflects  a sharp 
relative  shift  of thrifts  out of home  mortgage  investments.  Most strikingly, 
the share of saving  and loan  total  assets in home  mortgages  and agency 
securities  (largely Fannie  and Freddie pass—throughs)  fell from 72 to  57 
percent during  the 1982—87  period.  This portfolio  shift reflects  the reduced 
profitabiflty  of savings  and loans,  first due to high interest  rates and a 
maturity  mismatch  and then  due to disinflation  and credit  losses,  the expansion 
of savings and loan  asset  powers,  and a regulatory  enhanced  aversion  to 
interest  rate risk.  The reduced profitability  eroded  the tax incentives  for 
residential  mortgage  investment,  while  the expansion  of powers  and regulatory 
aversion  encouraged  thrifts  to invest  more widely (the latter  also encouraged 
switching  from  FRM5 to  AP.Ms) 
The half percentage  point  premium in the early  l9BOs provided  the 
incentive  for the securitization  of conventional  FRMs.  The premium  covered  the 
start up  costs  of the securitizers  and the liquidity  premium  demanded  by 
investors.  As the volume  of mortgage  pools  grew,  bid/ask  spread were bid down 
(and  thus the liquidity  premium  fell)  ,  and  the per dollar  costs of the 
securitizers  declined.  As a result, the yields  on conforming  conventional 
loans  fell by 30 basis points  relative  to  those  on  nonconforming  loans 
(Hendershott and shilling,  1988) 
IV.  Imperfect  Mortgage  Market  and Residential  Capital Accumulation 
The imperfect (subsidized) home  mortgage  market  in  the 1970s  led to more 
residential  capital  accumulation  than  a perfect,  fully—integrated  market  would 
have, while the disruption  of the market  in the early  1980s  did the reverse. —18— 
Also, with a perfectly  integrated  mortgage  market,  credit  rationing  would  not 
have existed.  This would  have increased  housing construction  during  the 
"rationing"  periods,  but decreased  construction  during  the subsequent  "catch 
up" periods,  Obtaining  a measure  of how residential  capital accumulation  would 
have  differed  had the mortgage  market  been  fully  integrated  is the purpose of 
this section. 
We  first  considered  using  a general equilibrium  simulation  model  to 
compute the long run equilibrium  impact.  However,  the largely  self-reversing 
nature  of the disturbances  —— higher  mortgage  rates in the 1970s  but lower  in 
the 1980s  end greeter  housing  starts  late in  the cycle  (removal of rationing( 
but lesser  starts  early in the next  one  (removal of catch up(  —— ruled  this 
approach  out; the long run impact  is negligible.  We decided  instead  to  modify 
the residential  investment  sector of  the Washington  University  Macro  Model 
(WIJMN(  and to simulate it.9  In what follows we first  describe  the WUMM 
residential  sector and our adjustments  to it and then  report  the simulations. 
The housing  sector of WUMM  determines  residential  investment, 
disaggregated  into  the value  of single-family  homes  constructed,  the value  of 
multi-family  homes  constructed,  the value of mobile  homes shipped,  and a 
residual  component  consisting  mostly  of the value  of additions  and alterations 
to existing  residential  structures.  Housing starts  and the stock  of  houses, 
both measured  in units,  are explained  by a neoclassical  model  of investment  in 
which  the equilibrium housing  stock  is determined  by demographic  factors,  the 
real  after—tax  cost of housing,  and cyclical considerations.  Starts  are 
translated  into completed  units  through  a completion  or phase-in  schedule. 
Finally,  the value  of  residential  construction  is derived  as the product  of  the 
number of units completed  and an exogenous  real value  per completion. 
- —19— 
We adjust  the WUMM sector in a number  of  ways.  First,  for the 1971—1988 
period we replace their  secondary  market  mortgage  rate in the rental  costs of 
capital  for owner-occupied  and rental housing,  respectively,  with our computed 
effective  mortgage  commitment  rate snd the WUMM corporate bond rate.  The 
effective  commitment  rate is  the coupon  rate  adjusted  for points.10  We switch 
from  the secondary  mortgage  market  rate  in  the rental coat  of  capital  for 
multifamily  housing to the corporate  rate,  rather  than the mortgage  commitment 
rate, because we are not analyzing  the impact of a perfectly  integrated 
multifamily  mortgage  market.  Second, we reestimate  the single-family  starts 
equation  using the effective  mortgage  rate and including  a credit  rationing 
variable  for the 1969-77 period.  Third, we endogenize  the real value  of 
single—family  completions.  The starts and real value  equations  follow 
Hendershott  (1980) 
The model is first  "adjusted"  to reproduce history.  That  is, add factors 
are put into each equation  so that  all variables  track  historic  values 
precisely.  Two aimulationa  are then  run.  In both,  the credit  rationing 
variable  is set equal  to zero.  In the second,  the actual home  mortgage  rate is 
replaced  by  the adjusted  perfect-market  rate. 
The effect of removing  credit  rationing  in the 1973.2  to 1975.4 period  on 
housing  starts  is illustrated  in Figure  2.  Rationing  aggrevated  the  slowdown 
in single—family  starts in 1974—75 and reinforced  the 1976—77  recovery.  With  a 
perfectly  integrated  mortgage  market, rationing  would  not have existed and this 
housing  cycle  would  have been  less aevere.12  An extra 15 billion  (1982$) of 
housing would  have  been  accumulated  by  the first quarter of 1976, but by the 
second  quarter  of 1978 the atock would  have  been back its original  value,  i.e., 
15 billion  dollars of housing  construction  would have  been  pulled  forward  in 
time. —20— 
Next  we anelyze  the impect  of shifting  the mortgage  rate to its perfect- 
market  path  and setting  the rationing  variable  to zero.  Figure  3 indicates  the 
impact  on the rsal  value  of residential  capital-  The 75  basis  point  increase 
in  the mortgage  rate  to the perfect  market  rate in 1971—73 lowers  the real 
stock by g billion  (1982$)  -  Then  the impact  of removing  credit  rationing  comes 
into play;  the real value rises by 14  billion  (from —9 to +5)  and then reverses 
itself by late 1978.  The additional  reduction  in the real  housing  stock  in the 
late 1970s  and early 1980s  reflects  the generally  lower level  of real price  of 
single  family  units constructed.  We then  see the effect of the perfect 
mortgage  rate falling from nearly  a half point above  the actual rate in 1980 to 
a half point below  in  the 1981—86 period;  the housing  stock  rises from nearly 
12 billion below  actual to 5 billion  below in early 1983.  The difference 
between  the simulated  stock  and the actual then  oscillates  around  this  value 
for the rest  of the simulation  period. 
IV. Conclusions 
The conventional  wisdom  that  mortgage  markets have  gradually  become 
integrated  with  capital markets  is  clearly consistent  with  the data.  The 
fixed-rate  government  insured mortgage  merket  (FHA/VA) appears  to have  been 
integrated  by  the early l980s, and the conventional  FRM  market  became 
integrated  during  the l980s.  This  integration  accelerated  in the 1986—88 
period when  the share of  newly—originated  conventional  conforming  fixed—rate 
mortgages  securitized by the Fannie  Mae and Freddie Mac jumped  to 50 percent. 
The regressions  imply that  virtually  all of the adjustment  to a cepital  market 
shock  is completed  within  two weeks.  Beceuse our retail mortgage  rate is a 
list (ratherthan  transaction)  price,  the lag may in fact  be even shorter. —21— 
Rates  on fixed—rate  conventional  mortgage  loans are currently  about what 
one would  expect  given  capital market (GNMA)  rates.  In  contrast,  conventional 
rates were a half percentage  point  too low  in the l970s, owing  to thrift  tax 
advantages  and portfolio  restrictions,  and a half  point 'too  high'  in  the 
1982—86 period  because thrift  profits  and portfolio  restrictions  had 
effectively  disappeared.  This half  point "excess' return  on  mortgages 
stimulated  development  and use of  the Freddie Mac and Fannie  Mae pass-through 
programs.  Since  early  1987,  rates on conforming  FRM5  have been in line with 
those  on  GNMAs. 
Had mortgage  rates always  been about  right, housing  production  would have 
been less in  the 1971—80 period  and more in  the 1981—83  span.  Moreover, 
housing  cycles  would have  been dampened.  On  net,  the residential  housing  stock 
would  be only slightly  below  today's level. —22— 
Footnotes 
1 
The agencies  also securitize  adjustable  rate and multifamily  mortgages. 
Between 1975 and 1982,  8 to 16 percent  of FHA multifamily  mortgages  were 
securitized  (Seiders,  1983 p. ?)  .  The  securitizetion  of conventional 
conforming  ARMs and multifamilies  by Fannie  Mae and Freddie  Mac is a more 
recent phenomenon.  In 1984—85,  only  2 to 3  percent were securitized;  in l986 
87, the percentage  was still  only  about  10.  The greater  securitization  of 
fixed—rate  single—family  mortgages  relative  to adjustable  rate and multifamily 
mortgages  likely  reflects  both the greater standardization  of the former  and 
the greater  desire of  originators  of ARMs  to hold them  in  portfolio. 
2 Because  default  on a guaranteed  loan  causes  prepayment  at  par, default  could 
in  principle  affect  required  returns,  but for the close  to per loans  that  we 
analyze the effect  must  be trivial. 
In general,  the price  is a function  of a vector  of interest  rates,  i.e., the 
entire  yield  curve matters.  In some  models (e.g., Cox,  Ingersoll,  Ross 
(1985) )  ,  all interest  rates can be  written  as a function  of a single  state 
variable,  the instantaneous  rate.  The Brennan-schwartz  papers  look at two 
rates,  a long and a short rate.  A casual, but reasonable,  simplification  is to 
look  at the yield  on  a Treasury  of duration  similar  to the mortgage  (but the 
latter's  expected  duration  itself  depends on the slope of the yield  curve)  - 
Volatility also  has two offsetting  effects on the value  of the noncallable 
bond.  Increased  volatility  of rates tends  to increase  expected  capital  gains 
because of the convexity  of the bond curve in Figure  1,  which  raises  value,  but 
to  the extent  there  is risk aversion,  increased  volatility  lowers  value. —23— 
Let 'the'  market  rate relevant  to  mortgage  prices be a weighted  average of 
short  Cr) and medium (r) term rates, where  the weight  depends  on the 
difference  (A)  between r  and r  .  Then  r  =  wr  + (l—w)r and w = w  - w  t. 
m  5  a  m  o  1 
Substituting,  r = r  - w  A + w  82 
m  o  1 
6 The correlation  between  residuals  is generally  close to, but less than, 
unity.  A perfect positive  correlation would  mean that the unexplained  part 
followed  a random  walk,  a property  consistent  with efficiency  in  the GNMA 
market.  That the correlation  is less than  unity  may be due to errors in 
measuring  volatility. 
Roth  (1988)  presents  regressions  of  changes  in  the commitment  rate  on the 
apread  between  the ten—year  Treasury  rate  and the previous  weeks  commitment 
rate.  The results are comparable. 
8 
The rates in this table  are not adjusted  for points,  i.e.,  they are the 
coupon  rates  consistent  with  whatever  points were chsrged.  The adjustment 
would  not affect  the differences  between actual  and perfect  rates  because the 
adjustment  to both rates would  be identical. 
g We had initially  intended  to  use the full WUMM in order to take into  account 
numerous  feedback  effects.  For example, a stimulus  to housing  would  raise 
output, creating  reinforcing  multiplier  and accelerator  effects.  On the other 
hand,  these would  raise  interest  rates generally,  offsetting  some of the 
stimulative  effect on housing  and causing a negative  impact on nonhousing 
capital.  We have not bothered  to incorporate  feedback  effects  because our 
"disturbances"  are self  reversing. —24— 
10 The adjustment  adds  (Points-l)/(4.20 + .106  slope — .345  vol)  to the coupon 
rate.  The denominator  in this adjustment  is the partial  of the coupon rate 
with respect to price  implied by equation  2—6 in Table  2. 
11 The credit  rationing  variable  is the PA variable  used by  Hendershott  (1980, 
pp. 412—13)  .  Rationing wss presumed  to exist when the average quarterly  growth 
rate in real adjusted deposits  during  the previous  two quarters  was less than 
one—qusrter  percent.  No evidence  of rationing  after  1978 could  be found. 
Less severity  in housing  cycles would  likely  lower  housing  costs and prices 
(Hendershott and Villsni,  1978, pp.  77—80) —25- 
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Table 1:  The Growth in  the Securitizetion of Fixed Rate Mortgages 
A.  FHA/VA 1-4 Family Loans 
1  2  3=2/1  4 
FNA/VA  GNMA  Share of  Origin-  Mortgage 
Originations  Issues  ations Securitized  Banker Share of 
($bil.)  ($bil.)  Originations 
1971—73  15.6  2.7  .17  .70 
11974—75  13.5  5.8  .43  .75 
1976—79  28.3  17.6  .62  .78 
1980—82  21.5  16.6  .77  .81 
1983—86  55.0  55.6  1.01  .78 
1987  752a  97.0  128e  70a 
B-  Conforming 1-4 Family Conventionela 
1  2  3  4=l/(2x3x0.8)  S 
Pasethroughs  Total Origin—  Fraction  Share of New  Mortgage Banker 
Backed By New ations  ($bil)  Fixed Rate Conforming FRMS  Share of 
FRN5 ($bil)  securitized  Originatione 
1976—81  3.5  119.6  1.00  .04  .07 
1982  9.4  77.8  0.64  .24  .15 
1983  14.1  154.2  0.70  .16  .15 
1984  10.8  176.0  0.48  .16  .15 
1985  31.7  204.6  0.57  .34  .14 
1986  120.2  357.1  0.78  .54  .15 
1987  95.4  369.2  0.66  .49  .16 
aNortgage banker issues are likely understated.  Thus originations and the mortgage 
banker share are too low,  and the share of originations securitized is too high. 
Sources:  1971—81 from Seiders  (1983,  1985); 1982—87 from  DataBase, 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table  3 
Mortgage Price Partial Derivatives with Respect to Slope and Volatility 
Parameter Values  Partial Derivatives 
Slope Volatility  Coupon-R7  Slope  Volatility 
2.5  1  1.5  .73  —1.39 
2.5  3  1.5  .86  —.83 
2.5  5  1.5  .99  —.28 
—1.5  3  1.5  —.07  —1.07 
—1.5  5  1.5  .06  —.51 
2.5  1  0.0  .57  —.87 
2.5  3  0.0  .70  —.32 
2.5  5  0.0  .83  .24 
—1.5  3  0.0  —.25  —.55 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Time Response  of Conventional Commitment Rates 
to Fictional Perfect Market Rates 
Adjustment to One Point Rise in Perfect Rate 
Time Period  Current  3 weeks  5 weeks  7 weeks  9 weeks 
1986—88  .59  .95  .96  .87  .84 
1983—85  .16  .55  .68  .83  .88 
1980—82  .08  .45  .75  .93  1.05 
1976—79  .01  .36  .62  .66  .86 
1971—75  .06  .17  .37  .56  .74 —33— 
Table  6:  Actual and Perfect Market  Effective conventional commitment  Rates  C's) 
Actual  Perfect  conventional  GNMA  Adjusted  Adjusted 
Market  Error  Error  Error  Perfect 
Market 
1971  7.54  8.33  —.74  —.74  8.33 
1972  7.38  7.92  —.53  —.53  7.92 
1973  8.04  8.97  —.93  —.93  8.97 
1974  9.19  9.78  —.60  —.60  9.78 
1975  9.05  9.92  —.87  —.87  9.92 
1976  8.86  9.22  —.35  —.35  9.22 
1977  8.84  9.09  —.24  —.24  9.09 
1978  9.64  10.08  —.44  —.44  10.08 
1979  11.20  11.34  —.14  —.14  11.34 
1980  13.76  14.24  —.48  —.48  14.24 
1981  16.69  16.48  .20  .07  .13  16.55 
1982  15.97  14.97  1.00  .27  .73  15.24 
1983  13.23  12.80  .43  .06  .37  12.86 
1984  13.89  13.80  .09  —.28  .37  13.52 
1985  12.43  12.01  .42  —.06  .48  1l95 
1986  10.19  9.62  .56  .07  .49  9.69 
1987  10.21  9.94  .27  .07  .20  10.03 
1988  10.23  10.24  —.01  —.03  .02  10.21 F
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